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Abstract
The paper furthers the neoclassical theory of earnings inequality. The
inequality multiplier is derived as the amount by which inequality in skills
must be multiplied to yield earnings inequality. Neutral technological change
and the real interest rate aﬀect inequality by changing capital per worker.
The eﬀect of capital per worker on the inequality multiplier is related to
skill diﬀerentials and capital-skill complementarity. The results explain in-
creasing inequality from the mid 1970’s into the 1990’s.
∗The author is indebted to Stacey Chen, Traci Mach, Gerald Marschke and Linda Wong for
helpful comments. Remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.1. Introduction
This paper furthers the neoclassical theory of earnings inequality. Under certain
conditions identiﬁed in this paper, an increase in capital per worker raises earn-
ings inequality as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation. Neutral technological
change, by inducing capital accumulation, can then raise earnings inequality.
Increases in earnings and income inequality from the 1970’s onward have been
extensively analyzed in the literature.1 Two major explanations for the increases
are skill-biased technological change and international trade that increases the
relative demand for more skilled workers.2 Data indicative of the increases in
inequality are shown in Table 1.3 The Gini Coeﬃcient is a standard measure of
inequality that is less sensitive to lower earnings than the variance of logarithms
and less sensitive to higher earnings than the measure used in this paper, the
coeﬃcient of variation. The next two columns show capital equipment per worker
and capital structures per worker. The skill column is the proportion of labor with
four years of college or more. The sixth column shows multifactor productivity.
The real interest rate in the last column is measured by the interest rate on long
term treasury bonds minus the rate of inﬂation. Inequality, productivity and
the real interest rate increased more rapidly from about 1980 on, while capital
equipment per worker grew at a greater rate from 1975 on and skill grew steadily
o v e rt h ee n t i r ep e r i o d .
In an approach that is also based on a neoclassical production function, Per
1See Lawrence F. Katz and David H. Autor (1999) and P. Gottschalk and T.M. Smeeding
(2000) for surveys of the empirical evidence. A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (2000) and
Sattinger (2001) provide general surveys of income distribution. Linda Wong (2003) examines
wage inequality in the context of a matching model.
2Daron Acemoglu (2002), Eli Berman, John Bound and Stephen Machin (1998), Katz and
Autor (1999, p. 1530-1535) and Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Murphy and Brooks Pierce (1993) discuss
skill-biased technological change. Adrian Wood (1995) considers the eﬀect of trade.
3The Gini Coeﬃcient is based on individual earnings from the March Current Population
Survey for full-time, year-round workers of both sexes. Capital equipment per worker is non-
residential equipment and software measured as a chain-type quantity index by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis divided by total nonfarm employment, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Capital structure per worker is nonresidential structures divided by total nonfarm employment.
The skill measure is the proportion of hours worked by men and women with four years of
college, from the Digest of Educational Statistics, weighted by male and female employment.
Productivity is measured by the Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index for manufactur-
ing. The real interest rate is measured by the average interest rate on U.S. Treasury bonds with
maturity over ten years minus inﬂation as measured by increases in the yearly average Consumer
Price Index (CPI-U).
2Krusell, Lee E. Ohanian, José-Victor Rios-Rull, and Giovanni L. Violante (2000;
see also Ohanian et al, 2000) relate changes in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wage
rates to capital-skill complementarity (Zvi Griliches, 1969; see also Sattinger, 1980,
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where the subscript t indicates time, kst is structure capital, ket is equipment capi-
tal, ut is unskilled labor and st is skilled labor. This is a nested Constant Elasticity
of Substitution production function in the three variables ket,u t and st. Au n i to f
labor is skilled if the worker has a college degree. Capital-skill complementarity
holds if η>ν .With this condition, a higher rate of growth of equipment capital
yields a greater skill premium. The authors ﬁnd that changes in factor quanti-
ties explain most of the skill premium variations in the past three decades. Both
Krusell et al and this paper conclude that changes in factor quantities (speciﬁcally
the ratio of capital to workers) aﬀect the skill premium (or diﬀerential). This pa-
per uses a simpler technology, extends the results to heterogeneous workers and
earnings inequality, and considers how real interest rates and neutral technological
change aﬀect the amount of capital per worker.
In the neoclassical theory relating real interest rates to inequality (Section
2), aggregate human capital or skill enters an aggregate production function.4 A
worker’s marginal product is then linearly related to the worker’s human capital
or skill level. Using this linear relation, inequality in earnings can be related
to inequality in human capital or skill. The inequality multiplier is the factor
by which skill inequality is multiplied to yield earnings inequality, as measured
by the coeﬃcient of variation. The inequality multiplier is derived analytically
in Section 3. Section 4 considers conditions under which an increase in capital
intensity raises the inequality multiplier, using the neoclassical condition that
factor prices equal marginal products. Theorem 4.3 shows that if output per
worker is homogeneous of degree less than one in capital per worker and human
capital per worker, and if the elasticity of substitution between the two variables
is less than one, then capital intensity raises the inequality multiplier. Section 5
analyzes determinants of capital intensity. Neutral technological change is shown
to induce capital accumulation, generating greater inequality if the conditions in
4An extensive literature disputes the use of production functions with substitutable factors
and aggregated capital. Standard references are C.J. Bliss, 1975; Edwin Burmeister, 1980; and
G.C. Harcourt, 1969.
3Section 4 hold. Section 6 considers empirical evidence from growth accounting and
factor shares on the parameters of the production function. Section 7 considers
eﬀects of the real interest rate on the distribution of skill and net eﬀects of variables
on inequality.
2. Production with Heterogeneous Workers
2.1. The Production Function
Assume there are n employed workers in an economy. Let gi be the skill of worker





be the aggregate skill in the economy. Let K be the aggregate amount of capital
in the economy. Suppose aggregate production in the economy is given by Q =
F(n,K,G). Assume F(n,K,G) has constant returns to scale in n, K and G. Let
κ = K/n be capital per worker and let γ = G/n be average skill or human capital
per worker. Then output per worker can be written as
f(κ,γ)=F(n,K,G)/n = F(1,K/n,G/n)=F(1,κ,γ) (2.2)
Let f1 = ∂f/∂κ and f2 = ∂f/∂γ. In terms of κ and γ, aggregate output can be
written as
Q = nf(κ,γ) (2.3)
Although F(n,K,G) has constant returns to scale in n, K and G, there is no
requirement that f(κ,γ) have constant returns to scale in κ and γ. If n, K and G
all double, κ and γ stay the same so that nf(κ,γ) doubles, whether or not f(κ,γ)
has constant returns to scale in κ and γ.
2.2. Worker Marginal Products
Theorem 2.1. As n increases, the marginal product for worker i approaches
MPi = f(κ,γ) − f1κ + f2(gi − γ) (2.4)
Proof. The marginal product of a worker with skill gi can be calculated as the
diﬀerence in output with and without the worker. Without the worker, there are
4n−1 workers, capital per worker is K/(n−1), and average skill is (G−gi)/(n−1).































For n suﬃciently large the changes approach 4κ = −κ/n and 4γ =( gi − γ)/n.
Then the marginal product of worker i, calculated as the total diﬀerential of Q, is
MPi = f(κ,γ)4n + nf14κ + nf24γ = f(κ,γ) − f1κ + f2(gi − γ) (2.8)
completing the proof.
Worker i’s marginal product consists of three terms. The ﬁrst term, f(κ,γ), is
output per worker. The second term, −f1κ, arises because an additional worker
reduces the capital available to other workers. That is, the capital used by a worker
has an opportunity cost determined by the capital’s contribution to production
for the remaining workers. The third term, f2(gi − γ), arises because worker i
raises or lowers the average skill level. The average of gi − γ over all workers is
zero, so that the average marginal product for all workers is f(κ,γ)−f1κ. Because
of the construction of the marginal product as the total diﬀerential of output, a
worker’s marginal product is a linear function of gi independent of the functional
form of output per worker, f(κ,γ).
3. Inequality Multiplier
This section relates inequality in earnings to inequality in worker skills. The two
inequality levels will not necessarily be the same since marginal products will
not in general be proportional to skills. The economic system exaggerates or
moderates skill diﬀerences in generating the distribution of earnings, depending
on the functional form of output per worker and levels of average skill and capital
per worker.
Marginal products are related to earnings through the neoclassical assump-
tion. Speciﬁcally, assume that factor prices equal factor marginal products in
equilibrium. Then the wage rate for worker i is MPi. If r is the rental cost of
5capital, then r = ∂F/∂K = n∂f(K/n,γ)=nf1(1/n)=f1. Let Γ be the standard
deviation of skills. Since the average wage is f(κ,γ)−f1κ, the standard deviation
of wages is
r³Xn








A descriptive measure of inequality is the coeﬃcient of variation, the standard
deviation divided by the mean. Assuming all workers supply the same amount of
labor, the coeﬃcient of variation of earnings, ω, is given by the standard deviation










In this expression, Γ/γ is the coeﬃcient of variation of skills.





With this deﬁnition, earnings inequality ω equals the inequality multiplier
times inequality in skills, as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation: ω = π(Γ/γ).
4. Eﬀects of Capital per Worker
4.1. The Inequality Multiplier
Deﬁnition 4.1. The capital-inequality hypothesis holds if an increase in capital
per worker raises the inequality multiplier.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose aggregate output is given by Q = nf(κ,γ) in 2.3 and




























Rearranging yields 4.1, completing the proof.
Further conditions can be derived assuming a speciﬁc functional form for out-
put per worker:
f(κ,γ)=( δκ
ρ +( 1− δ)γ
ρ)
 /ρ ,ρ < 1,ρ6=0 ,0 <δ<1, >0 (4.4)
This function is homogeneous of degree   and has constant elasticity of substitution
σ =1 /(1−ρ) (Ferguson, 1969, pp. 90-92). If ρ>0 then σ>1, and if ρ<0 then
σ<1.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose f(κ,γ) is given by 4.4. Then
π =
(1 − δ) γρ
δ(1 −  )κρ +( 1− δ)γρ (4.5)
If ρ<0 and  <1 or if ρ>0 and  >1, then ∂π/∂κ > 0 and the capital-inequality
hypothesis holds.
Proof. Since f(κ,γ) is homogeneous of degree  ,  f(κ,γ)=f1κ+f2γ by Euler’s
Theorem. Using this expression to solve for f1κ and then substituting into 3.3




(  − 1)ρ δ(1 − δ)κρ−1γρ
(δ(1 −  )κρ +( 1− δ)γρ)
2 (4.6)
Then ∂π/∂κ > 0 if ( −1)ρ>0. The two cases in the theorem then yield ∂π/∂κ > 0
and the capital-inequality hypothesis, completing the proof.
When ρ =0 , the elasticity of substitution is 1 and f(κ,γ) takes a Cobb-
Douglas form. If f(κ,γ) takes the Cobb-Douglas form Aκαγβ, then π = β/(1−α),
ac o n s t a n tu n a ﬀected by κ or r. If in addition α + β =1 , then π =1 . The
7inequality multiplier and the capital-inequality hypothesis can be analyzed using
other functional forms, such as Sato’s almost homogeneous function (R. Sato,
1977, p. 564).
4.2. Skill Diﬀerentials
Consider two workers with g1 >g 2. The skill diﬀerential between the workers
is the ratio of their wages. Assuming wages equal marginal products, the skill
diﬀerential is
θ =
f(κ,γ) − f1κ + f2(g1 − γ)






(g1 − g2)(f(κ,γ) − f1κ)κf11








Comparison with Theorem 4.2 shows that ∂θ/∂κ > 0 under the same conditions
that ∂π/∂κ > 0.
4.3. Capital-Skill Complementarity
The capital-inequality hypothesis can be related to capital-skill complementarity
as developed by Griliches (1969). Let σij be the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of
substitution between factor i and factor j. These elasticities are used to calculate
the eﬀects of factor prices on quantities demanded of factors. With the functional





Capital-skill complementarity arises if σKG <σ Kn. From 4.9, this arises if ρ<0
or equivalently if σ =1 /(1−ρ) < 1. Thus the capital-inequality hypothesis is not
equivalent to capital-skill complementarity unless  <1.
5. Determinants of Capital per Worker
5.1. Neutral Technological Change
Technological change can be introduced by writing output as Q = F(n,K,G)A,
where A is a measure of productivity. Increases in A reﬂect Hicks neutral techno-
8logical change (John Hicks, 1932). Then output per worker is given by f(κ,γ)A =
F(1,κ,γ)A. The technology parameter A drops out of the inequality multiplier,
so previous results remain valid. Although A does not aﬀect the inequality mul-
tiplier directly, it induces capital accumulation which then aﬀects the inequality
multiplier.
Theorem 5.1. Assume f11 < 0 and r, γ and Γ are given. If the capital-inequality
hypothesis holds and capital adjusts optimally, Hicks neutral technological change
raises the inequality multiplier and earnings inequality.










A = f1A (5.1)













Then an increase in A raises κ. Assuming the capital-inequality hypothesis holds,
t h ei n c r e a s ei nκ raises the inequality multiplier and earnings inequality in 3.2,
completing the proof.
As a result of this theorem, whether technological change is skill-biased cannot
be inferred solely from increases in the skill diﬀerential.
5.2. Real Interest Rate
Theorem 5.2. Assume f11 < 0 and A, γ and Γ are given. If the capital-inequality
hypothesis holds, an increase in the interest rate reduces the inequality multiplier
and earnings inequality.












Then by the capital-inequality hypothesis, an increase in r reduces π and earnings
inequality, completing the proof.
Note that an increase in r may raise inequality in income from all sources,
since interest income is received disproportionately by higher income individuals.
6. Empirical Evidence
6.1. Growth Accounting
Let  κ and  γ be the elasticities of output per worker with respect to κ and γ,
respectively. The parameter   in 4.4 is then the sum of these output elasticities
(Ferguson, 1969, p. 83). Results from the growth accounting literature provide
evidence on the values of  κ and  γ. N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David






where K is physical capital, H is human capital and AL is eﬀective units of labor.












so that  κ = α and  γ = β. They use data collected by Robert Summers and Alan
Heston (1988) and enrollment data as a proxy for the human capital savings rate.
With observations on 98 countries for which oil production is not the dominant
industry, Mankiw, Romer and Weil obtain results implying α = .31 and β = .28
(1992, p. 420). Then   = .31 + .28 = .59 < 1. Assuming their estimates of  κ and
 γ are robust to the functional form used in the estimation, the results would be
accurate for the functional form assumed in Theorem 4.3.
Jess Benhabib and Mark M. Spiegel (1994) use a later set of data from Sum-
mers and Heston (1991), combined with estimated human capital stocks developed
by George Kyriacou (1991). Using a limited sample of countries for which physical
10capital stocks were available, they obtain
Log(Y )=3 .391 + .614Log(K)+.349Log(L)+.189(H)+error (6.3)
where L is labor. This Cobb-Douglas form has increasing returns to scale since
.614+.349+.189=1.152>1. It implies that  κ = .614 and  γ = .189 so that   =
.803 < 1.5
Kreuger and Lindahl (2001) replicate and extend the Benhabib and Spiegel
results using the annualized change in Log(GDP), 1965-1985, as the dependent
variable. With a term for the level of schooling in 1965 included, the coeﬃcient of
the change in the logarithm of schooling is .178 and the coeﬃcient of the change
in the logarithm of physical capital is .461 (Kreuger and Lindahl, 2001, p. 1112).
These results imply  κ = .461 and  γ = .178, so that  <1.
The results from growth accounting support the conclusion that   =  κ+
 γ < 1. If in addition f(κ,γ) takes the CES functional form in 4.4 and ρ<0,
the capital-inequality hypothesis holds by Theorem 4.3. However, the growth
accounting literature provides no evidence on the elasticity of substitution between
physical capital per worker and human capital per worker.
6.2. Factor Shares
By Theorem 4.3, if  <1, the capital-inequality hypothesis holds if ρ<0. Then
σ =1 /(1 − ρ) < 1. This value of the elasticity of substitution has consequences
for factor shares that could be used to test whether conditions for the capital-
inequality hypothesis hold. Using the neoclassical assumption that r = f1, capi-













Theorem 6.1. Suppose output per worker is given by 4.4. An increase in γ raises
capital’s share of income if and only if σ<1.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating capital’s share in 6.4 with respect to γ yields
−
 ρδ(1 − δ)κργρ−1
(δκρ +( 1− δ)γρ)
2 (6.5)
5The coeﬃcient of Log(H) is not signiﬁcant. Benhabib and Spiegel provide other estimates
showing the human capital variable enters negatively or insigniﬁcantly.
11This derivative is positive whenever ρ<0, which holds whenever σ<1, complet-
ing the proof.
With output per worker given by 4.4, income from output can be divided
between capital and labor shares. Labor’s share of income, given by one minus
capital’s share in 6.4, combines a return to raw labor with a return to skill or
human capital. If an increase in γ reduces capital’s share, then it raises labor’s
share.
The measurement of labor and capital shares is complicated by the need to
allocate proprietor’s income and retiree payments between the two categories
(Kreuger, 1999). Although the current literature provides no evidence regarding
the eﬀects of human capital on factor shares, the implications of σ<1 provide
an indirect means of testing for conditions for the capital-inequality hypothesis.6
7. Conclusions
7.1. Distribution of Skills
Following the framework of some human capital models, the distribution of skills
is regarded as endogenously determined, whereas the analysis in this paper has
treated γ and Γ as given. The distribution of skills could be aﬀected by both
the real interest rate and technological change. The interest rate could aﬀect
the distribution of skills through two routes. First, a change in the interest rate
could alter the level of capital per worker, aﬀecting marginal products and wages
at diﬀerent skill or human capital levels. The changes in wage rates could then
lead workers to change levels of investment in human capital and the resulting
distribution of skills or human capital. In the second route, changes in the interest
rate can directly aﬀect decisions to invest in human capital in the same way
that the interest rate aﬀects investments in physical capital. At higher interest
rates, workers would undertake fewer human capital investments, everything else
the same. For example, James Heckman, Lance Lochner and Christopher Taber
(1998) develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to examine
wage diﬀerentials. The interest rate (and discount rates for individuals) explicitly
enter the analysis. However, the interest rate is assumed ﬁxed at .05 (1998, p. 19)
and eﬀects of changes in the interest rate are not derived.
6Using the functional form in 1.1, Krusell et al (2000a, p. 1041) estimate that the elasticity
of substitution between skilled labor and capital equipment, st and ket, is .67. However, this is
not an Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution.
12Neutral technological change can indirectly aﬀect decisions to invest in human
capital. Even though A in Section 5.1 drops out of the inequality multiplier, an
increase in A induces capital accumulation. If the capital-inequality hypothesis
holds, the capital accumulation would then raise skill diﬀerentials, increasing the
incentive to invest in human capital.
While some of the work on human capital investment decisions may carry
implications of the real interest rate for aggregate and average human capital,
there are no clear implications in this literature for the eﬀects of the interest rate
or technological change on the distribution of human capital or on Γ/γ. Because
Γ/γ is aﬀected mainly by new entrants and retirees, it would change slowly over
time. It is then reasonable to treat Γ/γ as given for the purposes of the analysis
in this paper.
7.2. Overall Implications
The overall implications of this paper’s results for earnings inequality can now be
considered. From 3.2, earnings inequality can be decomposed into the product of
the inequality multiplier and skill inequality. The increases in capital per worker
from 1975 on shown in Table 1 would have generated a higher inequality multiplier
if the capital-inequality hypothesis holds. The technological change shown in
Table 1 would have induced capital accumulation, while the increases in the real
interest rate from 1981 on would have reduced it.7 Increases in average skill would
also have induced capital accumulation. The net eﬀect is a substantial increase
in capital equipment per worker from 1975 to 1999.8 If the capital-inequality
hypothesis holds, this net increase in capital per worker would raise earnings
inequality. The primary cause would be technological change (not necessarily
skill-biased), supplemented by increases in average skill and moderated by higher
interest rates.
7Krusell et al (2000) observe that a price index for capital equipment developed by Robert
J. Gordon (1990) declined at a 4.5 percent rate through 1975. They calculate that it declined at
a 6 percent rate afterwards. These price declines would also contribute to capital accumulation.
Their relation to technological change (perhaps skill-biased) is unclear, particularly since capital
goods production is typically labor intensive.
8Krusell et al (2000, p. 1031) report that their measure of the stock of capital equipment
grew at 6.2 percent per year from 1963 to 1975, and at 7.5 percent afterwards.
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Year Gini Equipment Structures Skill Productivity Real Interest Rate
1967 0.340 0.476 0.809 0.098 77.5 1.753
1968 0.333 0.491 0.810 0.098 79.9 1.059
1969 0.326 0.506 0.808 0.107 80.5 0.617
1970 0.326 0.530 0.829 0.114 79.2 0.875
1971 0.328 0.550 0.849 0.115 81.4 1.340
1972 0.336 0.561 0.844 0.119 84.4 2.429
1973 0.330 0.580 0.836 0.129 85.9 0.101
1974 0.326 0.607 0.844 0.146 81.3 -4.018
1975 0.327 0.641 0.877 0.146 78.9 -2.116
1976 0.328 0.645 0.867 0.149 81.7 0.981
1977 0.332 0.655 0.852 0.151 82.9 0.557
1978 0.333 0.665 0.831 0.157 83.6 0.287
1979 0.335 0.687 0.828 0.165 82.7 -2.558
1980 0.331 0.716 0.850 0.171 81.3 -2.690
1981 0.334 0.740 0.873 0.183 81.9 2.588
1982 0.340 0.771 0.919 0.202 83.3 6.033
1983 0.340 0.783 0.932 0.206 85.2 7.642
1984 0.342 0.781 0.917 0.208 87.8 7.689
1985 0.348 0.789 0.920 0.211 89.2 7.152
1986 0.355 0.800 0.926 0.215 90.7 6.244
1987 0.353 0.798 0.924 0.218 93.5 5.034
1988 0.355 0.796 0.915 0.225 95.2 4.876
1989 0.362 0.801 0.912 0.228 93.4 3.788
1990 0.359 0.809 0.920 0.230 93.3 3.333
1991 0.355 0.833 0.945 0.230 92.4 3.959
1992 0.360 0.846 0.952 0.238 94.0 4.521
1993 0.389 0.856 0.945 0.239 94.9 3.455
1994 0.395 0.864 0.925 0.246 97.3 4.810
1995 0.388 0.883 0.914 0.247 99.2 4.135
1996 0.393 0.911 0.911 0.251 100.0 3.795
1997 0.394 0.941 0.906 0.256 103.5 4.368
1998 0.393 0.980 0.903 0.259 106.3 4.088
1999 0.399 1.019 0.902 0.264 109.4 3.933
17